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Abstract: The prevailing labor market models assume that minimum wages do not affect the 
labor supply schedule. We challenge this view in this paper by showing experimentally that 
minimum wages have significant and lasting effects on subjects’ reservation wages. The 
temporary introduction of a minimum wage leads to a rise in subjects’ reservation wages which 
persists even after the minimum wage has been removed. Firms are therefore forced to pay 
higher wages after the removal of the minimum wage than before its introduction. As a 
consequence, the employment effects of removing the minimum wage are significantly smaller 
than are the effects of its introduction. The impact of minimum wages on reservation wages 
may also explain the anomalously low utilization of subminimum wages if employers are given 
the opportunity of paying less than a minimum wage previously introduced. It may further 
explain why employers often increase workers' wages after an increase in the minimum wage 
by an amount exceeding that necessary for compliance with the higher minimum. At a more 
general level, our results suggest that economic policy may affect people’s behavior by shaping 
the perception of what is a fair transaction and by creating entitlement effects.  
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1 Introduction  
For decades, economists have been interested in the economic and social consequences of 
minimum wage laws. Important puzzles remain, however, despite much progress in both labor 
market theory and empirical analysis. First, several studies report anomalously low utilization 
of subminimum wages in situations where employers actually could pay workers less than the 
minimum (Freeman, Wayne and Ichniowski 1981; Katz and Krueger 1991, 1992; Manning and 
Dickens 2002). Katz and Krueger (1992) found, for example, that the introduction of the 
opportunity to pay subminimum wages to youth had no discernible effect on teenage workers’ 
wages. This underutilization of the opportunity to pay less than the prevailing minimum 
occurred even though the vast majority of firms paid a starting wage below the new hourly 
minimum immediately before it became effective. Second, there is evidence (e.g. Card and 
Krueger 1995, Katz and Krueger 1992) that minimum wage laws have so-called spillover 
effects. After an increase in the minimum wage, fast food restaurants increased wages for 
workers by an amount exceeding that necessary to comply with the higher minimum wage. 
Third, the new minimum wage research in the 1990s (Card 1992; Card and Krueger 1994, Katz 
and Krueger 1992, Machin and Manning 1994; Dolado, Kramarz, Machin, Manning Margolis 
and Teulings 1996) questioned the conventional wisdom that increases in the legal minimum 
wage always cause a decrease in employment. Although these results remain contested (see, 
e.g., Neumark and Wascher 1992 and 2000; Card, Katz and Krueger 1994; Card and Krueger 
2000) it is probably fair to say that they constitute a considerable challenge to the conventional 
view of the employment effects of minimum wages.  
Why do profit maximizing employers not take advantage of the possibility of reducing 
wages below the legal minimum, and why do they pay more than the required minimum for 
those workers who earned less than the new minimum wage before it was introduced? We 
report the results of laboratory experiments that examine the driving forces behind these 
phenomena in this paper. We provide, in particular, evidence showing why profit maximizing 
employers may find it profitable to pay workers much higher wages after the removal of a legal 
minimum wage than before its introduction.1 This result provides an explanation for the 
anomalously low utilization of subminimum wage opportunities because these opportunities 
were typically introduced after a previous increase in the minimum wage. In addition, our data 
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper we use the term "employer" or "firm" for subjects who are in the role of an employer in the 
experiment. The term "worker" is used for subjects who are in the role of a worker in the experiment. 
 
 
 
2
show why profit maximizing employers may find it optimal to pay wages above the minimum 
wage even if they paid wages much lower than the minimum wage before its introduction. This 
result provides an explanation for the second puzzle, i.e. why there are wage spillover effects. 
Finally, we report evidence indicating that profit-maximizing employers may find it optimal to 
raise employment after the introduction of a binding minimum wage whereas it is not optimal 
to reduce employment after the removal of the minimum wage. These patterns provide an 
explanation for the possibility of positive employment effects of minimum wage increases and 
they suggest an important asymmetry between the introduction and the removal of minimum 
wages. 
We identify the observed pattern of reservation wages as the driving force behind all 
these phenomena. One of the advantages of laboratory experiments is the possibility of 
measuring variables that are hard or impossible to measure in the field. We measure workers’ 
reservation wages in our experiments, enabling us to compute employers' profit maximizing 
responses to the introduction and the removal of minimum wages. In this context, an important 
finding is that workers’ fairness concerns strongly shape individual reservation wages. The 
material payoff of not working in our experiment is identical across workers and far below the 
marginal revenue of a worker at full employment. Thus, if all workers were completely selfish, 
firms would face an infinitely elastic labor supply schedule up to the point where they employ 
all workers. However, workers do not accept any wage offer that is above a purely selfish 
individual's reservation wage. Instead, they exhibit considerably higher reservation wages, i.e. 
they reject wages offers they perceive to be unfairly low. This finding has the important 
consequence that – on average – individual firms face an upward sloping labor supply schedule.  
Moreover, individual workers’ reservation wages are affected by the minimum wage, 
suggesting that the minimum wage affects what is perceived as a fair wage. After the 
introduction of a minimum wage, workers’ reservation wages increase and a substantial share 
of the workers even exhibits reservation wages above the legal minimum. Profit-maximizing 
firms are thus forced to pay wages above the minimum, which explains the spillover effect. 
After the removal of the minimum wage, workers’ reservation wages decrease somewhat; 
however, their reservation wages still substantially exceed those before the introduction of the 
minimum wage. It seems that the minimum wage leads to a kind of ratchet effect in workers’ 
perception of what constitutes a fair wage. This means that individual firms face a tighter labor 
supply schedule after the removal of the minimum wage than before its introduction. Therefore, 
it is a profit maximizing strategy to pay substantially higher wages after the removal of the 
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minimum wage than before the introduction. This finding explains why firms may find it 
unprofitable to utilize subminimum wage opportunities.  
Our finding that the firms’ labor supply constraint after the removal of a minimum wage 
is tighter than before its introduction echoes results reported in Katz and Krueger (1992). They 
report that 62 percent of fast food restaurant managers who were not using the subminimum 
opportunity for youth believed they could not “attract qualified teenage workers at the 
subminimum wage” although the vast majority of these restaurants hired workers at less than 
the new minimum wage prior to its increase. In this context, it is important to stress that in our 
experiments, the mere experience of a minimum wage regime increases reservation wages 
relative to a situation where subjects did not have this experience. Relative comparisons 
between different categories of workers did not play any role in the experiment because either 
all workers or none of them were subject to the minimum wage. In reality, however, the 
introduction of subminimum wage opportunities is typically restricted to certain subcategories 
of workers. Therefore, firms who pay subminimum wages to these workers may face an even 
stronger resistance to accept subminimum wages.  
The pattern of reservation wages also shapes the employment effect of the minimum 
wage. Since workers’ fairness concerns impose an upward sloping labor supply constraint on 
individual firms, firms can increase employment if they pay higher wages. Theoretical analyses 
(Rebitzer and Taylor 1991, Manning 1995 and 2003, Burdett and Mortensen 1998, Bhaskar and 
To 1999) indicate that a minimum wage may actually increase employment under these 
circumstances. However, this is not obvious in our context for two reasons. First, as we will 
show below, the employment response depends on the concrete slope of the labor supply 
schedule; profit-maximizing firms will only increase employment if this slope is sufficiently 
steep. Second, the rise in reservation wages due to the introduction of the minimum wage 
could, in principle, induce firms to reduce employment. We observe, however, that the increase 
in reservation wages is not strong enough, i.e., the profit-maximizing wage response to the 
introduction of the minimum wage implies an increase in employment. Our subjects seem to 
have understood this quite well because on average, the actual wage and employment changes 
are rather close to the profit-maximizing wage and employment changes. 
The asymmetric response of reservation wages to the introduction and the removal of the 
minimum wage is associated with asymmetric employment effects. Actual wages do not 
decrease to pre-minimum wage levels after the removal of the minimum wage because 
workers’ reservation wages remain high. As firms pay higher actual wages in the post-
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minimum wage situation than in the pre-minimum wage situation, more workers accept the 
firms’ wage offers and employment decreases less after the removal of the minimum wage than 
it increased after the introduction of the minimum wage. In fact, we can show that if one takes 
the asymmetric response of reservation wages into account, the asymmetric employment effect 
is a consequence of employers’ profit-maximizing behavior.  
Although the introduction of a minimum wage led to a positive employment effect in our 
experiment, one should not conclude from this that a positive employment effect will also 
prevail in the real world because the number of firms was fixed in our experiment. If we had 
allowed for entry and exit of firms, the employment effects might well have been negative 
because the minimum wage decreased profits substantially. In addition, if we had allowed for 
endogenous investment choices, the profit-decreasing effect of minimum wages would 
probably have reduced the capital stock and hence employment. Finally, much depends on the 
concrete quantitative details in both reality as well as in our experiments, such as the slope of 
the labor supply schedule. Thus, minimum wages may have negative employment effects, 
depending on the specific quantitative features of the labor market under consideration.  
Since the driving force behind our results is the impact of the minimum wage on 
reservation wages, it is natural to ask why minimum wages have this effect. As fairness 
concerns are likely to be the decisive motive behind workers’ willingness to reject low wage 
offers, we believe that the peculiarities of preferences for fairness and reciprocity play a role 
here. The behavioral relevance of fairness intentions could be a reason why the minimum wage 
raises reservations wages. For example, paying a wage of x may reveal a fair intention before 
the introduction of the minimum wage because the firm may have the opportunity of paying 
even less; after the introduction of a minimum wage of y ! x, however, the same wage x may be 
considered less generous because the firm has to pay y anyway. Evidence from other 
experiments (e.g., Blount 1995, Falk et al. 2003, Brandts and Charness 2004) also lends support 
to the idea that fairness intentions matter.  
For our purposes, the study of Brandts and Charness (2004) is particularly interesting 
because they introduced a minimum wage in the context of a labor market with worker moral 
hazard where workers’ fairness concerns drive effort. They show that workers provide less 
effort for the same wage level in the presence of the minimum wage, lending support to the 
view that workers’ effort responses are partly shaped by fairness attributions. However, 
intention based fairness preferences cannot explain the asymmetric response in workers’ 
reservation wages in our context. Therefore, we speculate that minimum wages may create a 
kind of entitlement effect or status quo effect which shapes workers’ fairness preferences. If the 
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minimum wage establishes a status quo, where payment below the minimum wage is 
experienced as a loss, loss aversion may play a role and the resistance to wage cuts may be 
particularly high. While this idea seems plausible to us, we do not know of any fairness model 
with endogenous reference points that could rationalize the impact of minimum wages on 
reservation wages. Although several fairness approaches explicitly formalize the notion of 
intention based fairness preferences (Rabin 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004, Falk and 
Fischbacher, forthcoming), these fairness models cannot explain the asymmetric impact of 
minimum wages on reservation wages. 
At a more general level, our results suggest that economic policies may not only affect 
the incentives for private agents, but also change the perception of what is fair and create 
entitlement or status quo effects. In the past, economists have concentrated their efforts on 
understanding the incentive effects of government policies. However, our results – in 
combination with other recent evidence (Madrian and Shea 2001; Ariely, Loewenstein and 
Prelec 2003) that seemingly innocuous situational details can have powerful behavioral effects 
– suggest that economists may gain a lot by focusing their research also on these other effects 
of government policies. Public policies affect behavior not only through changing incentives.  
In addition, the result that reservation wages and, hence, actual wages remain high after 
the removal of the minimum wage may also inform us about the forces behind the adjustment 
of reservation wages over time. Our result suggests that reservation wages may be strongly 
shaped by actual wage payments which were previously experienced. This finding may have 
important consequences for the debate regarding the compatibility of the “wage curve”, as 
documented by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), and the Phillips curve. In particular, one 
condition for the compatibility of the wage curve approach with the Phillips curve approach is 
that past increases in real wages be fully reflected in current increases in reservation wages 
(Blanchard and Katz 1997, 1999). 
In the following we first present our experimental design. Then we present our results in 
Section 3. In Section 4, we examine the extent to which the impact of minimum wages is due to 
the fact that minimum wages are necessarily a kind of wage guideline. Therefore, we study the 
impact of nonbinding wage guidelines on actual wages and reservation wages in this section. 
Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.  
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2 Experimental Design 
In this section, we present the experimental design. We first describe the experimental game, 
followed by a description of the treatments and procedures. Finally we discuss the behavioral 
predictions.  
2.1 The Experimental Game 
Workers are randomly matched to firms in each period of the experiment, and can only 
conclude a contract with the firm with which they are matched. There are 6 firms and 18 
workers in each experimental session, i.e., each of the 6 firms is randomly matched with three 
workers in each period. Firms have identical revenue functions with labor as the only variable 
input and a decreasing marginal revenue product of labor. To hire workers, firms can submit a 
unitary wage offer w to the matched workers, i.e. wage discrimination is ruled out. Firms can 
make wage offers to all matched workers or to fewer workers. Workers do not know how many 
wage offers the firm makes; each individual worker only knows whether he or she received a 
wage offer.  
A worker can accept or reject w. If the worker rejects w, he or she is unemployed and 
earns nothing in this period. If a worker accepts the offer, a binding contract is concluded; the 
worker receives w and the firms’ revenue increases according to the marginal revenue the 
worker generates. Each firm’s revenue function is shown in Table 1.  
Table 1: Firms’ revenue function 
Employed workers Total revenue Marginal revenue 
0 0 - 
1 390 390 
2 740 350 
3 1000 260 
Firms’ profits are given by total revenue minus wages. Thus an individual firm’s profit function 
is as follows: 
Firm
0, if no worker is employed
390 - , if one worker is employed
740 - 2 , if two workers are employed
1000 -3 , if three workers are employed
w
w
w
"
#
#$ % &
#
#'
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Workers’ payoffs depend on the wage offer and on whether the offer is accepted or rejected. 
Thus payoffs for workers are: 
 Worker
0, if no wage offer is received
0, if a wage offer is rejected
, if a wage offers is acceptedw
"
#$ % &
#
'
 
Both workers’ and firms’ payoff functions are common knowledge among the participants. 
After all decisions in a period are made, payoffs are calculated and displayed on the subjects’ 
computer screens: firms are informed both about their own payoffs and those of the workers 
with whom they have been matched; workers, too, are informed both about their own payoffs 
and that of their firm. The next period begins after all subjects have received this payoff 
information. 
Since we were particularly interested in workers’ individual reservation wages, we used 
the strategy method to elicit workers’ acceptance decisions. To this end, workers were asked to 
indicate the lowest wage they would in fact be willing to accept before they knew which wage 
offer they actually received. If the wage offer actually received was lower than the worker’s 
acceptance threshold, the offer was automatically rejected, otherwise it was accepted. Note that 
the specification of an acceptance threshold determined a worker's complete strategy, because 
the worker implicitly stated his accept/reject response to every possible wage offer. Neither the 
firms nor the other workers were informed about an individual workers’ acceptance threshold. 
The firm was only informed about how many workers accepted its wage offer.  
The acceptance threshold represents a worker’s reservation wage. This information about 
reservation wages will prove useful for understanding the firms' behavioral responses to the 
introduction and the removal of minimum wages. In addition, the information about reservation 
wages enables us to implement a useful matching procedure. A large body of evidence now 
indicates that a significant share of experimental subjects exhibit a preference for fairness and 
reciprocity (Camerer 2003, Fehr and Schmidt 2003). In addition, the strength of fairness 
motives differs among those subjects who care for fairness. Therefore, we expected both a 
significant share of the workers to exhibit positive reservation wages as well as heterogeneity in 
these reservation wages. This means that – on average – firms face an upward sloping labor 
supply schedule. Thus, if we play the experiment for a very large number of periods, firms are 
likely to learn the distribution of reservation wages, enabling them to respond appropriately to 
this distribution.  
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However, repeating the same experiments for very many periods has also the drawback 
that subjects become bored or that their concentration diminishes over time, increasing the 
randomness of their behavior. Therefore, we only repeated each treatment condition for 15 
periods and increased the probability of a firm receiving a representative draw of matched 
workers by implementing the following matching protocol. We partitioned workers according 
to their reservation wage into three groups of equal size in each period such that there was a 
group with high, a group with intermediate and a group with low reservation wages. The 
random matching ensured that each firm faces one worker from each group. We conjectured 
that, regardless of the behavioral equilibrium (i.e., the stable behavioral pattern) in our setting, 
this matching protocol would speed up adjustment towards this stable pattern.   
2.2 Treatments and treatment orders 
To study the economic effects of a legally binding minimum wage, each session contains two 
treatments: a treatment without a minimum wage (NO) and a treatment with a minimum wage 
(MW). Both treatments are played for 15 periods. The minimum wage is set at a level of 220, 
i.e., firms cannot offer wages below 220 in the MW treatment. Therefore, the range for 
admitted wage offers for firms is defined as follows: the constraint  
0 ( w ( 1000 prevails in the NO treatment, while wage offers have to obey 220 ( w ( 1000 in 
the MW treatment. We implemented two treatment sequences to control for potential sequence 
effects. Subjects first completed the NO and then the MW treatment in the NO_MW sequence, 
while this order was reversed in the MW_NO treatment. 
2.3 Subjects, payments and procedures 
All subjects were students of the University of Zurich or the Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology Zurich (ETH). Each subject participated in only one session. Subjects were 
randomly subdivided into two groups before the start of the experiment; some were assigned 
the role of a firm and others the role of workers. The assigned roles remained fixed for the 
whole session. All interactions were anonymous, i.e., the subjects did not know the personal 
identities of their trading partners. 
To make sure that subjects fully understood the procedures and the payoff consequences 
of the available actions, each subject had to read a detailed set of instructions before the session 
started. After reading the instructions, participants had to answer several questions regarding 
the feasible actions and the payoff consequences of different actions. We only started a session 
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after all subjects had correctly answered all questions. The exchange rate between experimental 
currency units (“points”) and real money was 150 Points = 1 Swiss Franc (~US $ 0.80). 
The computerized experiment was programmed and conducted with the experimental 
software z-Tree (Fischbacher 1999). We conducted a total of five sessions with the NO_MW 
sequence and five sessions with the MW_NO sequence. We had 24 subjects (six firms and 
eighteen workers) in each session, yielding a total of 240 participants in the experiment. A 
session lasted approximately two hours and subjects earned on average 49 Swiss Francs (CHF 
49 ~ US $ 40). 
2.4 Behavioral conjectures 
If we assume common knowledge of rationality and money-maximizing behavior, the 
prediction for this experiment is straightforward. Since the outside option is zero, selfish 
workers accept every positive (or non-negative) wage offer, which the firms anticipate. Thus, in 
a subgame perfect equilibrium of the NO treatment, firms offer a wage of one (or zero) to all 
three workers and the workers accept.2 Full employment thus results, and firms reap almost all 
gains from trade. Firms cannot offer wages below the minimum wage of 220 in the MW 
treatment. Since the minimum wage is less than the third worker’s marginal product, profit-
maximizing firms offer the minimum wage to all three workers. As in the NO treatment, all 
workers are employed. A further implication of common knowledge of rationality and 
selfishness is that the treatment order does not affect the predicted behavior in any treatment. 
However, as already mentioned, there is considerable evidence for the existence of 
heterogeneous preferences for fairness and reciprocity (see, e.g., the surveys of Camerer 2003, 
and Fehr and Schmidt 2003). These preferences imply that a person is willing to sacrifice 
material payoff in order to punish either unfair behavior or unfair people, or to move payoffs 
closer to equality. In our context, for example, a worker could punish a firm for offering a low 
wage by rejecting the latter's offer. If firms anticipate that some workers reject low offers, they 
may have an incentive to increase their wages beyond those predicted by the self-interest 
model. Moreover, the existence of heterogeneous fairness preferences also means that firms do 
not face a flat, but an upward sloping labor supply schedule. We believe that this feature of our 
experiment is externally valid in view of the many frictions that are present in real world labor 
                                                 
2 Every strategy combination of the following form is a subgame-perfect Nash-equilibrium: The firm offers a wage 
of one to all three workers, at least one worker accepts only positive wage offers and the other workers accept all 
non-negative wage offers. Additionally, there is also another subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, in which every 
worker accepts all non-negative wage offers and therefore the firm offers a wage of zero. 
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markets. Mobility costs and search costs in a world of imperfect information may well generate 
upward sloping labor supply schedules for individual firms. Manning (2003), for example, 
provides substantial evidence in favor of this view. In addition, a simple thought experiment 
suggests that the labor supply schedule individual firms face is not completely flat: Do we 
expect all employees to quit if a firm cuts all wages by one percent? The likely answer to this 
question is NO and, therefore, the labor supply schedule is likely to be upward sloping. The real 
question, therefore, is how strongly individual firms’ labor supply schedules are upward 
sloping. Empirical evidence alone, and not assumption, can answer this question.  
It is well known (see, e.g., Bhaskar and To 1998 or Boal and Ransom 1997) that if firms 
face an upward sloping labor supply schedule, increases in the minimum wage may not reduce 
but instead even increase employment because the hiring of additional workers can only be 
accomplished in the absence of a minimum wage if all workers' wages increase. Minimum 
wages may also have this effect in our experimental setting. Depending on the level and the 
degree of heterogeneity in reservation wages, it may be profit maximizing to hire less than 
three workers. For example, if reservation wages of the three matched workers are (0, 10 and 
100), hiring three instead of two workers produces marginal costs of 3)100 – 2)10 = 280, 
which exceeds the marginal revenue of the third worker, which is only 260. It is therefore 
optimal for the firm to hire two instead of three workers in this case. The introduction of a 
minimum of 220 reduces the marginal cost of labor from 280 to 220, which is less than the 
marginal revenue of the third worker. Thus, hiring all three workers is profitable in the presence 
of the minimum wage.  
However, it is also easy to see that minimum wages need not have such an effect. If, for 
example, the distribution of reservation wages is (30, 60, 100), the marginal cost of employing 
the third worker is given by 3)100 – 2)60 = 180 which is below the third worker's marginal 
revenue. Therefore, a profit maximizing firm employs all three workers regardless of whether 
there is a minimum wage or not. These examples illustrate that much depends on the concrete 
distribution of reservation wages. No concrete quantitative predictions are possible in the 
absence of knowledge about this distribution. For this reason, we postpone a more detailed 
analysis of the effects of fairness preferences on experimental outcomes to Section 3.1. In this 
section, we calculate profit maximizing wages for the observed distribution of reservation 
wages and discuss their employment consequences. 
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3 Results 
In this section we present our main results. We concentrate on the economic effects of 
introducing a minimum wage (the NO_MW sequence) in Section 3.1. We start by reporting 
how the minimum wage regime affects wages. These results are subsequently explained in the 
light of workers’ reservation wages. Next we investigate and explain the employment effects of 
introducing a minimum wage. We analyze the effects of a removal of minimum wages on 
wages and employment (the MW_NO sequence) in Section 3.2. Special emphasis is given to 
potential asymmetries in this context, i.e., we explore whether the treatment effects (NO vs. 
MW) are affected by the treatment sequence (NO_MW vs. MW_NO). 
3.1 Introducing the minimum wage – effects on wages, reservation wages, and 
employment 
Our first result concerns the wages paid to workers in the NO and the MW treatments of the 
NO_MW sequence. The main findings can be summarized as follows: 
Result 1 (wages): In the absence of a minimum wage law, actual wages are much higher than 
predicted by the self-interest model; however, the vast majority of wages is below the minimum 
wage level of 220. Nevertheless, in the presence of a minimum wage law, the majority of actual 
wages is not just raised to the level of the minimum wage but above that level. 
Support for Result 1 comes from Figure 1 and Table 2. Figure 1 shows a histogram of all wages 
paid to workers, both in the NO and the MW conditions, with wage intervals in steps of 10. As 
is obvious from this figure, wages in the NO condition (grey bars) are much higher than the 
self-interest model predicts. On average, firms pay wages of 188 and the standard deviation is 
32.1. The lowest wage paid in the NO condition is 25 and more than 94 percent of all wage 
payments are equal to or above 150. 
Figure 1 also shows that wages increase substantially after the introduction of the 
minimum wage (black bars). The average wage in the MW condition is 237.7 with a standard 
deviation of 11.1. The treatment differences in wages are highly significant, as can be inferred 
from Table 2. In this table, we report results from a regression. We regress wages on a MW 
dummy, which takes the value one if the observation comes from the MW treatment and a zero 
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otherwise.3 The coefficient of the MW dummy is positive and significant on any conventional 
level. 
Figure 1: Histogram of wages in the NO and the MW conditions (NO_MW sequence) 
 
 
Table 2: Effects of introducing a minimum wage on wages 
 Dependent variable: wage 
MW dummy       50.11*** 
(7.46) 
Constant       187.58*** 
(8.38) 
Number of observations 2021 
Prob > F .003 
R-squared .533 
Note: OLS estimation with robust standard errors clustered on sessions in parentheses, *** indicates significance 
at the 1-percent level. 
 
                                                 
3 Since observations within a session may be dependent, all reported robust standard errors are clustered on 
sessions. This holds for all regressions in this paper. 
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Figure 1 illustrates a further interesting observation. Note that many wages in the MW 
condition exceed 220, the level of the minimum wage. Only seven percent of all wages are 
exactly at the level of the minimum wage, all other wages are higher than 220. This “spillover” 
effect of minimum wages is remarkable, since the minimum wage was binding in the sense that 
without the minimum wage, only 8 percent of the wages were above 220. Put differently, while 
92 percent of the wages were below 220 before the introduction of the minimum wage, firms 
subject to the minimum wage regime pay wages above 220 in 93 percent of the cases. 
Result 1 raises two important questions: 1) Why do wages attain their high level in the 
absence of a MW law? 2) Why do wages exceed the MW in the presence of the MW law? To 
answer these questions we need to take a closer look at reservation wages.  
Result 2 (reservation wages): In the absence of the minimum wage law, individual reservation 
wages are much higher than the self-interest model predicts, but almost all of them are below 
the minimum wage level of 220. However, in the presence of the minimum wage law, a large 
share of the subjects exhibit reservation wages above the minimum wage level. 
Support for Result 2 comes from Figure 2 which shows a histogram of stated reservation wages 
in the NO condition (grey bars) and the MW condition (black bars) of the NO_MW sequence. 
Reservation wage intervals are in steps of 10. Figure 2 reveals that only about 8 percent of all 
reservation wages are between 0 and 10 in the NO condition, i.e., only a small minority of 
workers chooses reservation wages close to the level the self-interest model predicts. In 
contrast, more than 82 percent of the chosen reservation wages are at least 100, 66 percent are 
at least 150 and 28 percent are 200 or higher. However, only 9 percent are equal to or higher 
than the later minimum wage of 220. The resulting mean reservation wage is 145. 
The distribution of reservation wages in the NO condition is consistent with the view that 
preferences for fairness and reciprocity shape workers’ acceptance thresholds. Workers with 
high acceptance thresholds could earn much more if they were willing to reduce their 
thresholds. This can be shown empirically by regressing the workers’ earnings on their 
reservation wages. This results in a strongly negative relationship in the NO condition, with a 
“reservation wage coefficient” of -.499 and a t-statistic of -15.6 (OLS regression with robust 
standard errors, clustering on sessions). Apparently, many workers are willing to accept the 
costs of rejecting low offers.  
Figure 2 also shows that the introduction of the minimum wage affects reservation wages. 
While 91 percent of the reservation wages are below the minimum wage level in the NO 
condition, 49 percent of reservation wages exceed the minimum wage in the MW condition. 
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This result suggests that minimum wages systematically affect what is considered to be a fair 
wage. Many workers seem to perceive a wage of 220, which would have been considered as 
fair and quite generous in the NO treatment, as unfairly low. 
Figure 2: Histogram of reservation wages in the NO and the MW condition (NO_MW 
sequence) 
 
A plausible explanation for this finding can be given in terms of fairness intentions. Several 
experiments have shown that the same payoff distribution is perceived differently depending on 
the underlying fairness intentions (e.g., Blount 1995, Falk et al. 2003). In Falk et al. (2003), for 
example, the rejection rate of an unfair offer depends on the set of available offers: the proposer 
could make an offer of 8:2 (8 for the proposer and 2 for the responder) or 5:5 in the main 
treatment of their $10 ultimatum game, while the proposer's offers were limited to 8:2 or 10:0 
in a control treatment. The rejection rate for 8:2 was very high (44%) in the main treatment, 
contrasting with the low rejection rate in the control treatment (9%). Thus, subjects in this 
experiment behaved as if they perceived the same offer (i.e., 8:2) as less fair when the equal 
split (5:5) was the available alternative. A similar psychological mechanism may explain the 
shift in reservation wages after the introduction of the minimum wage. In our context, offering 
a wage of 220 is likely to be perceived as generous as long as the firm has the option of 
offering less. However, offering a wage of 220 does not signal similar fairness intentions if this 
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is the lowest offer a firm can make. In other words, 220 may be perceived as fair if the 
minimum is zero but not if the minimum is 220. 
Intuitively, Result 2 provides the basis for answering the two questions raised by Result 
1. Fairness preferences may make it profitable for the firms to pay relatively high wages in the 
NO treatment, while the change in reservation wages due to the minimum wage law may make 
the payment of wages above the minimum wage in the MW treatment profitable. To check this 
conjecture, we computed the firms’ profit maximizing wage across treatments and for each 
session, given the workers' observed reservation wage schedule. Remember that three workers 
are assigned randomly to each firm at the beginning of a period. After indicating their 
reservation wages, the workers are subdivided into three groups: a low (l), a medium (m), and a 
high (h) reservation wage group. Subsequently, each firm is randomly matched with one 
worker out of each of these three groups. Assuming that firms know the distribution of 
reservation wages, they choose their wage offers in order to maximize the following expected 
payoff:4 
   * + * + wwpwpwpwpwpwpwE hmlhmlF ,--.,-,-,% )()()(260)(350)(390)()(/       (1) 
where pi is the probability that a worker in the reservation wage group i 0 {l, m, h} accepts the 
offered wage. Accordingly, the first order condition is: 
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The optimal wage w* equalizes the marginal revenue of a higher offer with its marginal 
cost. As in a standard monopsony problem, the marginal cost of a wage increase not only 
consists of the wage multiplied by the expected change in employment, but also includes the 
additional wage costs for the expected employment realized at the previous wage level. 
                                                 
4 To a first approximation, the proposers in the ultimatum game typically make offers that maximize their expected 
monetary earnings. For example, the modal offer was close to the offer that maximized the proposers’ expected 
earnings in each of the 4 countries in which Roth et al. (1991) conducted ultimatum games. Therefore, we assume 
that firms in our setting maximize their expected monetary payoff.   
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Given the actual distribution of reservation wages in the experiment, it is possible to 
calculate the optimal wage and employment for each firm in each period.5 Table 3 shows the 
average of the resulting optimal wage offers together with average wages actually realized for 
each session in the NO and the MW treatment. 
Table 3: Optimal wages and those actually chosen in the NO and the MW conditions 
(session averages in the NO_MW sequence) 
 NO condition MW condition 
Session 
number S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S1-5 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S1-5 
Optimal 
wage 177 183 151 189 184 177 233 227 237 238 232 233 
Actual 
wage 165 172 154 189 200 176 234 228 237 238 243 236 
 
This table reveals several interesting findings. First, the optimal wage across sessions in the NO 
condition lies between 151 and 189. This explains our finding that wages greatly exceed the 
low level the self-interest model predicts. Second, on average firms pay wages that closely 
approximate optimal wages. The relative differences between optimal and actual average wages 
per session are between 0.29 percent (Session 4) and 8.7 percent (Session 5). This suggests that 
firms well understood the monopsonistic profit-maximization problem. Third, the correlation 
between the means of optimal and realized wages in sessions is positive and highly significant 
(Spearman’s rho = .900, p=.0374). This shows that firms not only understood the maximization 
problem but also responded to the session specific distribution of reservation wages. This is 
quite remarkable, given that firms were not informed about the distribution of reservation 
wages but had to discover it in a trial and error process. Fourth, Table 3 shows that, as a 
consequence of the increase in reservation wages in the MW condition, optimal wages in fact 
exceed 220. This provides an explanation for the spillover effect reported in Result 1, i.e., the 
fact that firms pay wages in the MW condition that are not only higher than those in the NO 
condition, but also in excess of 220. Moreover, the difference between optimal and actual 
wages is rather small, as it is in the NO condition, indicating that firms well understood the 
                                                 
5 We calculate the wage that maximizes expected profits in each period of every session, given the matching 
procedure described above and assuming that firms have perfect knowledge about the distribution of workers’ 
reservation wages. 
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optimization problem. The relative difference between optimal and actual wages is in most 
sessions below one percent in the MW treatment. 
In Section 2, we argued that firms may not be willing to employ all three matched 
workers when reservation wages are heterogeneous. Figure 2 shows that workers exhibit a 
considerable degree of heterogeneity with respect to their reservation wages in the NO 
condition. As firms’ wage offers are close to optimal (see Table 3), it is therefore likely that 
employment is lower than predicted by the self-interest model. In principle, the introduction of 
a minimum wage could therefore lead to an increase in employment, because firms in the MW 
condition are exogenously forced to pay a minimum wage far above the observed average wage 
level in the NO condition. However, we also know that minimum wages lead to a considerable 
increase in reservation wages so that workers reject wage offers under a minimum wage regime 
that they would have accepted in the absence of a minimum wage law. Depending on the 
strength of each effect, the minimum wage law can therefore increase or decrease employment. 
Result 3 summarizes our findings concerning the employment effects of the introduction of a 
minimum wage: 
Result 3 (employment): Employment in the absence of the minimum wage is much lower than 
the self-interest model predicts. The introduction of minimum wages causes a significant 
increase in employment. However, due to the increase in workers’ reservation wages, the 
employment effect of the minimum wage is smaller than it would have been had workers’ 
reservation wages remained stable. 
Support for Result 3 comes from Table 4 and Table 5. Table 4 shows employment per firm for 
the NO and the MW sessions. The table reveals that employment is clearly below the level 
predicted by standard theory in the NO condition. Instead of three workers, 2.1 workers are 
employed on average and employment per firm does not exceed 2.4 in any single session. The 
reason for why firms employ less than three workers has to do with the level and the 
heterogeneity of workers’ reservation wages. The reason for the low employment level is not 
that firms submit too few job offers. In fact, firms submit three job offers in 96.2 percent of the 
cases. However, 28.9 percent of the offers are turned down on average. 
Table 4 also shows that the introduction of the minimum wage increases employment in 
our experiment. Average employment increased from 2.1 workers per firm in the NO treatment 
to 2.4 workers per firm in the MW treatment, an increase of about 14 percent (see final column 
in Table 4). Importantly, this positive employment effect of minimum wages occurs in each of 
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the five sessions. In Table 5, we report results of a regression where firm level employment is 
regressed on a MW dummy. The coefficient of the MW dummy is positive and significant at 
any conventional level.  
 
Table 4: Employment per firm in the NO and MW sessions (NO_MW sequence) 
Session number S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S1-5 
NO condition 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.1 
MW condition 2.4 2.5 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.4 
 
 
Interestingly, profit maximizing behavior by firms implies an increase in employment after the 
introduction of the minimum wage. In Table 6, we report the profit-maximizing employment 
levels in the NO and the MW condition, given the distribution of reservation wages in each 
session, in comparison to actually realized employment levels. Table 6 shows that it was not 
profit maximizing for firms to hire three workers in the NO condition. Instead, profit-
maximizing employment ranges from 2.01 to 2.49. Firms responded accordingly by choosing 
wages that resulted in an average employment between 1.91 and 2.38 workers per firm. 
 
Table 5: Effects of introducing a minimum wage on employment 
 Dependent variable: employment 
MW dummy     .291*** 
(.048) 
Constant      2.10*** 
(.078) 
Number of obs 900 
Prob > F .0038 
R-squared .0357 
Note: OLS estimation with robust standard errors clustered on sessions in parentheses, *** 
indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
Table 6 indicates that the increase in reservation wages in the MW condition offsets the 
potential positive employment effect to a considerable extent, but not completely. Remember 
that only 9 percent of all stated reservation wages were above the minimum wage level of 220 
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in the NO condition. This implies that, without a shift in reservation wages, the minimum wage 
would have increased the employment level to almost the maximum of three workers per firm. 
However, Table 6 shows that the profit-maximizing employment level in the MW condition, 
given the change in the distribution of reservation wages, is below three in each session but 
above the respective profit-maximizing level in the NO condition. This increase in the profit-
maximizing employment level provides an explanation for the higher actual employment level 
after the introduction of the minimum wage. 
 
Table 6: Optimal and actual employment levels in the NO and the MW conditions (session 
averages in the NO_MW sequence) 
 NO condition MW condition 
Session 
number S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S1-5 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S1-5 
Optimal 
employment 2.30 2.49 2.01 2.47 2.28 2.31 2.61 2.61 2.31 2.51 2.30 2.47 
Actual 
employment 2.03 2.04 1.91 2.13 2.38 2.10 2.36 2.49 2.19 2.40 2.52 2.39 
 
 
3.2 Removing the minimum wage – economic effects and asymmetries 
Up to this point, we have studied the economic effects of introducing a minimum wage. In the 
following we explore the minimum wage effects on wages and employment when the minimum 
wage is removed rather than introduced. In particular, we will focus on the question whether 
the economic effects are symmetrical, i.e., whether the treatment order (NO_MW vs. MW_NO) 
affects the nature of the treatment effects (NO vs. MW). Since the treatments (NO and MW) 
are exactly the same regardless of the treatment order, one would expect that removing the 
minimum wage lowers both wages and employment significantly. Moreover one would expect 
that the effects are similar in size to those resulting from the introduction of a minimum wage. 
Result 4 shows that this conjecture is not borne out by the data. 
Result 4 (asymmetry in wages): The temporary introduction of the minimum wage has 
permanent effects on actual wages, i.e., even after the removal of the minimum wage, actual 
wages remain close to the previous minimum wage level. Thus, pre- and post-minimum wage 
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economies exhibit significantly different wages, although the two economies are identical in all 
exogenous parameters. 
 
Support for Result 4 comes from Figures 3 and 4 and from Table 7. Figure 3 shows employed 
workers' average wages over time for both treatments in both sequences. Wages in the MW 
treatments of both the MW_NO and NO_MW sequences are very similar. In the MW_NO 
(NO_MW) sequence, 11 (7) percent of the paid wages are exactly at the level of the minimum 
wage, while 89 (93) percent of the wages are higher. This shows that the spillover effect 
described in Result 1 appears, regardless of whether we introduce the minimum wage at the 
beginning of the experiment or after subjects experienced an economy without the MW. In 
addition, the mean wage is exactly 237.7 in both sequences. 
 
 
Figure 3: Average wages of employed workers in the NO_MW and MW_NO sequences 
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Figure 4: Distribution of wages in the NO conditions of the NO_MW and the MW_NO 
sequences 
 
While wages in the MW conditions are identical, wages in the NO conditions differ 
substantially. While the mean wage in the NO treatment (see section 3.1) of the NO_MW 
sequence amounts to 188, it remains at 213 in the MW_NO sequence after removal of the 
minimum wage. Thus the previous minimum wage strongly affects wages in the NO condition 
of the MW_NO sequence. Further evidence for this result is found in Figure 4, which displays 
the distribution of wages in the NO conditions of both treatment sequences. Our results show 
clearly that high wages (above 200) are chosen much more frequently in the NO treatment after 
the removal of the minimum wage than before its introduction. The results of Table 7 further 
support this, showing that the wage difference between the NO_MW and the MW_NO 
sequence is highly significant. Wages are regressed on a MW dummy, a MW_NO-dummy and 
the interaction of the two. The MW dummy takes the value one if the observation comes from 
the MW treatment and zero otherwise. Likewise the MW_NO dummy takes the value 1 if the 
observation comes from the MW_NO sequence and zero otherwise. Finally, the interaction 
variable MW dummy*MW_NO dummy is an interaction term of these two dummy variables. 
Since we omitted the dummy for the NO_MW sequence, the constant in this regression 
measures the average wage in the NO treatment of the NO_MW sequence. The MW dummy 
measures the wage increase due to the MW treatment in the NO_MW sequence. It is positive 
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and significant. The MW_NO dummy measures the difference in actual wages in the NO 
condition across treatment sequences. The coefficient of this dummy indicates that wages in the 
NO condition are 25.7 units higher after the removal of the minimum wage law than before its 
introduction. The interaction term measures the difference in the MW effect across sequences. 
The coefficient of the interaction term is significantly negative, indicating that the impact of the 
minimum wage on actual wages is smaller in the MW_NO sequence than in the NO_MW 
sequence. Thus, the results of the regression indicate that a minimum wage law has lasting 
effects on actual wages even after the removal of the law. 
 
Table 7: The effects of an introduction vs. a removal of the minimum wage on actual wages 
 Dependent variable: Wage 
MW dummy 50.11*** 
(7.03) 
MW_NO dummy 25.70*** 
(8.85) 
MW-dummy*MW_NO dummy -25.70*** 
(7.53) 
Constant 187.58*** 
(7.91) 
Number of obs. 4076 
Prob > F .0000 
R-squared . 472 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on sessions in parentheses, *** indicates significance at the 1-percent level. 
 
Why do firms pay higher wages after the removal of the minimum wage than before its 
introduction? A key factor in answering this question is again the impact of minimum wages on 
reservation wages.  
Result 5 (asymmetry in reservation wages): Reservation wages are higher after the removal of 
the minimum wage than before its introduction. 
 
Support for Result 5 comes from Figure 5. It shows a histogram of reservation wages in the two 
NO conditions, i.e., in the NO_MW and the MW_NO sequences. The figure reveals that the 
relative frequency of high reservation wages is much higher after the removal of the minimum 
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wage than before its introduction. While only 28 percent of the reservation wages are 200 or 
higher in the NO_MW sequence, this number is 52 percent in the MW_NO sequence. For 
wages above or equal to 220, the respective numbers are 9 and 23 percent. 
Figure 5: Histogram of reservation wages in the NO conditions of the NO_MW and MW_NO 
sequences 
 
Figure 5 also shows that very low reservation wages are chosen more frequently after the 
removal of the minimum wage. While in the NO_MW sequence only 10 percent of the stated 
reservation wages are below 30, this is the case for 17 percent of the reservation wages in the 
MW_NO sequence. Taken together, these observations lead to the following aggregate picture: 
The average reservation wage is 145 before the minimum wage is introduced and 157 after its 
removal. The respective median values are 150 and 200. The big difference between median 
and average values comes from the shift at the lower end of the reservation wage distribution. 
While the small increase in very low reservation wages strongly influences the average 
reservation wage in the MW_NO sequence, this change does not affect the median. However, 
the probability of being assigned a worker with a very low reservation wage remains rather 
small for firms; thus, the data on average reservation wages is likely to underestimate the 
economic impact of the former minimum wage on actual wages in the NO condition of the 
MW_NO sequence. The change in medians, therefore, better captures the likely economic 
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relevance of the increase in reservation wages for the formation of actual wages; the medians 
suggest that reservation wages are strongly influenced by the previous minimum wage law. 
The results of Table 8 further support the finding that the previous minimum wage law 
affects reservation wages in the NO condition. In the first column, reservation wages are 
regressed on a MW dummy, a MW_NO-dummy, and the interaction of the two. The same 
regression model is employed in the second column for medians of reservation wages per 
period, session, and treatment. The constant measures the reservation wage in the NO treatment 
of the NO_MW sequence. The MW_NO-dummy measures the difference between the 
reservation wages in the NO treatments across sequences. The coefficient of this dummy is 
positive in both regressions, but only significant in the second column: median reservation 
wages are thus significantly higher in the post minimum wage economy than in the pre 
minimum wage economy.  
 
 
Table 8: Effects of an introduction vs. removal of a minimum wage on reservation wages 
 Dependent variable: 
 Average reservation 
wage 
Median reservation wage 
MW dummy 78.31*** 
(3.52) 
64.01*** 
(4.44) 
MW_NO dummy 11.70 
(9.57) 
26.67** 
(8.84) 
MW-dummy*MW_NO dummy -11.75 
(9.83) 
-27.47** 
(8.89) 
Constant 145.16*** 
(4.71) 
161.69*** 
(4.04) 
Number of obs. 5400 300 
Prob > F .0000 .0000 
R-squared .256 .761 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on sessions in parentheses, *** indicates significance at the 1-percent 
level., ** indicates significance at the 5-percent level. Median reservation wages are calculated per period, session 
and treatment.  
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The sum of the MW_NO dummy and the interaction term measures the difference in the two 
MW conditions.6 In both regressions, the effect is basically zero (11.70 – 11.75 = -0.05 
respectively 26.67 – 27.47 = – 0.8) and insignificant (F-Test: MW_NO dummy + MW 
dummy*MW_NO dummy = 0, p = 0.709 and p = 0.713, respectively), which indicates that the 
treatment sequence does not affect reservation wages in the MW conditions. 
Why do minimum wages exert asymmetric effects on reservation wages? One reason 
may be that the minimum wage, or the high wages associated with its existence, generate 
feelings of entitlement which persist after the removal of a binding minimum wage. Schlicht 
(1984) defines entitlements as “rights, as perceived by the individual. They are not, however, 
legal rights. Rather they denote the subjectively perceived rights that go along with a 
motivational disposition to defend them” (p. 24). Important sources for the formation of 
entitlements are past allocations, which results in a “sense of ownership in the status quo” Zajac 
(1995, p. 121). Applied to our context, we speculate that once workers have been exposed to a 
minimum wage, they become used to receiving a relatively high wage. This experience may 
create entitlements, i.e., workers think they have a right to receive high wages and are willing 
to defend them. As a consequence, they set relatively high reservation wages even after the 
elimination of the minimum wage. 
So far we have shown that the minimum wage continues to affect the distribution of 
reservation wages after its elimination. However, the question remains open whether this effect 
should change the wage setting behavior of profit-maximizing firms. The calculation of profit-
maximizing wages given the different distributions of reservation wages can provide an answer. 
Figure 6 shows the distributions of optimal wages for the two NO conditions. When we 
aggregate, we get an optimal mean (median) wage of 184 (200) for all NO sessions of the 
MW_NO sequence compared to 177 (180) for all NO sessions in the NO_MW sequence, 
respectively. The calculations and the figure show that it was optimal for firms to pay higher 
wages after the removal of the minimum wage than before its introduction. 
                                                 
6 Intuitively, this claim holds for the following reason. The MW dummy takes on a value of one in the MW 
condition of the NO_MW sequence, while all three dummy variables in the regression take on a value of one in the 
MW condition of the MW_NO sequence. Thus, the difference between the MW conditions in the two different 
sequences is represented in the regression by the situation where the MW_NO dummy and the interaction term 
take on a value of one.  
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Figure 6: Histogram of profit-maximizing wages in the NO conditions of the NO_MW and 
MW_NO sequences 
 
The same calculations for the MW treatments reveal that there are no differences between the 
two sequences. Optimal mean (median) wages are 233 (230) for the MW sessions in the 
NO_MW sequence and 231 (230) for the MW sessions in the MW_NO sequence. These 
calculations are in line with the fact that wages in the MW treatments are practically identical, 
regardless of the sequence of treatments. 
Due to the long lasting effects of a temporary minimum wage on actual wages, the 
introduction and the removal of the minimum wage have asymmetric wage effects. This wage 
pattern may, therefore, be associated with asymmetric employment effects. Result 6 shows that 
this is indeed the case. 
Result 6 (asymmetry in employment): The introduction of the minimum wage causes 
significantly larger employment changes than its removal. In particular, the introduction 
causes a significant increase in employment, whereas the removal leaves employment 
unchanged. 
Table 9 provides support for Result 6. Similar to Table 4 it shows average employment in the 
NO and the MW condition for every session of the MW_NO sequence. The figures indicate 
that average employment levels are very similar in the MW and the NO conditions of the 
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MW_NO sequence. In fact, the difference in employment for all sessions is only 1.5 percent. In 
contrast, in the NO_MW sequence the overall employment difference is 13.9 percent. 
 
Table 9: Employment per firm in the NO and MW sessions (MW_NO sequence) 
Session number S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S1-5 
NO condition 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.2 2.3 
MW condition 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.3 
 
 
The regression in Table 10 shows that the employment effects of the minimum wage differ 
significantly between the NO_MW and the MW_NO sequences. The significantly positive 
coefficient of the MW dummy indicates that employment increases after the introduction of the 
minimum wage. Recall that the interaction term measures the difference in the effect of 
minimum wages across sequences. Thus, the negative coefficient of this term indicates that the 
employment effect of the minimum wage is smaller in the MW_NO sequence than in the 
NO_MW sequence. Finally the regression also shows that there is no significant difference in 
employment between the NO and the MW treatments in the MW_NO sequence because the 
sum of the MW dummy and the interaction term are close to zero and insignificant (0.291 – 
0.258 = 0.033, F-Test: MW dummy + MW dummy*MW_NO-dummy = 0, p = 0.464).7  
 
                                                 
7 The sum of the MW dummy and the interaction term give us the difference between the NO condition and the 
MW condition of the MW_NO sequence for the following reason: all three dummy variables in the regression take 
on a value of one in the MW condition of the MW_NO sequence, while only the MW_NO dummy takes on a 
value of one in the NO condition of this sequence.  
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Table 10: Effects of an introduction vs. removal of a minimum wage on employment 
 Dependent variable: employment 
MW dummy .291*** 
(.046) 
MW_NO dummy .167 
(.095) 
MW-dummy*MW_NO dummy -.258*** 
(.063) 
Constant 2.10*** 
(.074) 
Number of obs. 1800 
Prob > F .0008 
R-squared .020 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on sessions in parentheses, *** indicates significance at the 1-percent level. 
 
 
4 Sources of the minimum wage effect 
One of our most important findings concerns the impact of the minimum wage on workers’ 
reservation wages. Workers behaved as if they perceived the same wage to be less fair after the 
introduction of the minimum wage because they rejected wage offers that they previously had 
accepted. Therefore, the minimum wage seems to affect workers’ views of what constitutes a 
fair wage. If this conjecture is true, then other interventions that change workers’ fairness 
perceptions may have similar effects. In particular, nonbinding wage guidelines may also raise 
workers' reservation wages if they are set above the wage which previously prevailed. In 
reality, employer or employee organizations or government institutions sometimes propose 
wage guidelines. To examine the conjecture regarding the effects of wage guidelines, we 
conducted further control sessions. Subjects in these sessions first experienced the situation 
without a wage guideline (and without minimum wages) for 15 periods, after which we 
introduced the guideline. The level of the wage guideline was set at 220 – the level of the 
minimum wage in the previous sessions. Like the minimum wage, the guideline was common 
knowledge among the subjects and it was made clear that the guideline only constituted a 
nonbinding rule about the lower bounnd of firms' wage offers. We conducted a total of two 
sessions with wage guidelines. The results of these sessions are depicted in Figures 7 and 8. 
Figure 7 shows that the introduction of the wage guideline led to a considerable increase in 
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reservation wages. The average reservation wage without the guideline is 115 whereas the 
reservation wage with the guideline is 154 on average. The share of observations at 200 and 
220 is much higher with the wage guideline. However, we observe almost no reservation wages 
above 220 in the presence of the wage guideline. Thus, although the guideline raises 
reservation wages, the increase is smaller than after the introduction of a binding minimum 
wage because 49 percent of the stated reservation wages were even above 220 in the latter case 
(see Figure 2). 
Figure 7: Histogram of reservation wages in the NO and the WG conditions 
 
Figure 8 shows that the increase in reservation wages is also associated with an increase in 
actual wages. The average wage in the treatment without the guideline is 175, while average 
wages are 206 in the guideline treatment – a rise of 26 units. Interestingly, as in the case of 
reservation wages, there is a strong rise in the share of paid wages at 200 and 220. Recall from 
Section 3.1 that the introduction of a minimum wage increased wages by roughly 50 units. 
Thus, roughly half of the wage increase legally binding minimum wages cause may be 
attributed to the guideline effects of minimum wages whereas the other half of the wage 
increase is due to the legally binding character of the minimum wage. 
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Figure 8: Average wages of employed workers in the NO and the WG condition 
 
The change in employment rounds up the effects of wage guidelines. Average 
employment per firm is 2.21 without the guideline whereas average employment increases to 
2.47 in the presence of the guideline. Thus, as in the case of a legally binding minimum wage, 
the wage increase the guidelines cause seems to ease firms’ labor supply constraint and 
contributes to a higher employment level.  
5 Concluding remarks 
Almost all economic reasoning is based on the assumption that behavioral changes are 
predominantly or even exclusively caused by changes in the incentives people face. Therefore, 
economic policy analysis is focused on how policy shapes incentives. However, the results of 
this paper suggest that economic policies have deeper effects. Subjects in our experiments 
exhibited higher reservation wages after the introduction of the minimum wage. This suggests 
that minimum wages affect subjects’ fairness perceptions. A wage that is considered fair may 
no longer be perceived as such after the introduction of the minimum wage. Moreover, 
reservation wages are higher after the removal of the minimum wage than before its 
introduction. This suggests that minimum wages may generate entitlement or status quo effects. 
We believe that similar effects may also shape the impact of economic policies in other 
domains. In our context, these effects help us understand why a minimum wage increase may 
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cause a rise in actual wages that exceeds the increase in the minimum wage. The impact of 
minimum wages on reservation wages also provides a plausible explanation for the employers' 
hesitation to use opportunities to pay subminimum wages. This indicates that considering how 
economic policies shape the perceived fairness of the interactions between private agents and 
the perceived entitlements may enable researchers to explain hitherto puzzling phenomena.  
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